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THE CORPORATE DEBENTURE SYSTEM OF SOUTH
AMERICAN COUNTRIES
VICTOR E. CAPPAt
TmE financial eminence of England and the United States, together with
the growth of corporation law which has attended the predominant use of
the corporate form of organization, has resulted in a process of absorption
by the Latin-American codes of certain elements of Anglo-American
jurisprudence, particularly those relating to corporate finance. This ac-
ceptance of the principles of the new system by the codes derived from the
civil law is not based on the authority of the dollar or the pound sterling.
It results, rather, from the greater convenience of the financing practices
of the common-law countries. Thus is reversed the process by which the
English Chancellor subordinated a varying individual guide of conscience
to the doctrines of the Roman jurisprudence because of their utility in
filling the gaps of a new system. The difference is that while the Chancel-
lor observed a discreet silence as to the source of his decisions, only
occasionally directly adverting to the sanction of the borrowed principles,'
the Latin jurist has acknowledged the origin and even criticized some of
its aspects. 2
The process has not been confined to the adoption of mere formal
elements, but has been concerned with substantive matters. It has gone
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The author is indebted to Dr. Richard P. Momsen of Momsen & Freeman, New York
City, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for a copy of the new Brazilian decree discussed infra,
as well as for helpful suggestions, and to Mr. Louis Bergh of Marvin & Bergh, New York
City, for helpful criticism.
1. See MARYBY, ELM=TS OF LAW (6th ed. 1905) § 90; 1 SPENca, EQUITABLE JUnis-
DICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1846) 1, 413.
2. See 2 MALAGARRIGA, C6DIGO DE CO-&-RCIO COIMNTADO (3d ed. 1927) 266. The author
criticizes the use in the Ley de Debentures, infra note 3, of the English word "debenture" in
preference to the Castilian "obligaci6n." The earlier Commercial Code employed the
words "bonos" and "obligaciones," but the word "debentures" had long been in popular
use and was accepted by the Ley. It is recognized as being synonymous with "obligacion"
in Articles 22, 37, 38, 39 and 40. Rivarola and Malagarriga are of the opinion that the
use of words from other languages is justifiable only when there is no Spanish equivalent,
as is the case with the word "warrant," and express the hope that in a future reform
the Spanish "obligacion" will be used in the Ley. 2 MAIAGARRIGA, op. cit. supra, at 265;
AARIO RIVAROLA, SoCzEDADEs ANf6tis (2d ed. 1924) 140. The Brazilian code uses the
word "obrigac5es" of the Portugese idiom as well as the English word "debentures." See
decreto no. 177A de 15 de Setembre de 1893, infra note 6, which regulates the "emissao
de emprestimos em obrigacaes ao portador (debentures)."
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as far as actual innovation. Thus while the right of a corporation to
borrow money by issuing debentures is merely an application of the
Roman contract of "mutuum" to a modern corporation, the introduction
of the fideicomisario, or Latin equivalent of the common-law trustee, into
the law of South American countries, although restricted in use to
corporate finance matters, was nonetheless a startling departure for a
system whose sole interest in the institution of trusteeship had been to
prohibit it.
The Anglo-American system of fiduciary representation of bondholders
was adopted in Argentine in the Ley of 1912.1 Under it the appointment
of fideicomisarios for the protection of future debenture holders is re-
quired before the debentures may be issued, and the duties of supervising
the activities of the corporate debtor and of protecting the interests of
the debenture holders fall on them. The fideicomisarios alone have any
standing or legal personality to take measures for the safety of the
debenture holders.' The individual holders, and even the assembly of
debenture holders, have none.
While the Ley is thus an advance over the scant provisions of the code
of commerce, it has required little interpretation from the courts. From
1924 to 1931, the period of greatest financial activity, only some twelve
decisions of the commercial court of the capital involved questions neces-
sitating interpretation. Nevertheless, the Argentine jurist Rivarola,
writing in 1924, believed that progress had been made only in theory.r
His reason was that Argentine was not a country with great accumula-
tions of savings; few debentures had been issued in the twelve and a half
years the law had been in force. Yet the Ley had the advantage that,
having kept pace with economic developments, Argentine was legisla-
tively prepared for the time when small capital would acquire the habit
of investing in debentures. Moreover, it had the highly practical merit
of removing grave inconveniences which formerly blocked the local en-
forcement of loan contracts executed abroad by native companies.
The Brazilian Lei of 1893,6 which first recognized the right of a
corporation to issue debentures as a "mutuario," made no provision for
the appointment under trust indenture of a fideicomisario to represent the
3. LEY D DEBENTURES oF ARGENTINE, Ley no. 8875 de 23 Febrero de 1912, referred to
herein as the Ley. The Argentine jurist Malagarriga has written that the Ley was inspired
by the law and practices of England and of the United States. This origin is revealed
in the use of the English word "debenture," which appears fifty-five times in the Ley,
instead of the Spanish word "obligaci6n." See note 2, supra.
4. Cam corn de la capital mayo 15 de 1925, T. 15, at 100, cited in 2 RicARDo Vcr~oaRI,
SEGuNDo DiccioNARIo DE JU ISPRUDENCIA (1931).
5. 2 MAmio RrvARoLA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146-147.
6. Lei no. 177A de 15 de Setembre de 1893, referred to herein as the Lei.
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debenture holders. In passing this Lei the Brazilian Senate rejected a
recommendation of the legislative committee that general assemblies of
debenture holders be constituted with power to appoint a trustee to
supervise the corporation and to rate the security of the debentures.
However, the practice grew of appointing in the contract of issuance a
"mandatario" with all the powers of an agent. Through this civil-law
form the common-law trust purpose was achieved. In recent years, the
tendency of court decisions and of legal commentators has been to
recognize the similarity of 'the position of the "mandatario" and the
trustee and to use the latter term in preference to the former. Thus
Carvalho de Mendonqa in his Direito Commercial quotes Manson and
other English authorities and uses the word frequently in his exposition
of the debenture system.7  This reliance on English sources was not
characteristic of the earlier commentator, H. Inglez de Souza, whose
Titulos ao Portador no Direito Brazileiro was long a leading authority
on debentures.
The defect of the Lei in not providing a system of fiduciary representa-
tion of the debenture holders and in requiring each "debenturista" '' to act
separately in order to conserve his rights on default, was supplied in
1914 by two accordams of the Tribunal de Justiqa de S. Paulo.' It was
held in these cases that certain bankers who were appointed by the
debenture holders as trustees with power to represent them foi all
purposes could validly defend the rights of the latter, in the event of the
failure of the corporate debtor, without having to produce the debentures,
and could enforce the preference to which the debenture holders were
entitled by the terms of their security. The bankers were admitted to
the "reuniao de credores" (creditors' meeting) as representatives of the
7. 4 CA.ivaO DE MEDONCA, DnErro COMERCIAL (1915) 151 et seq. The learned
commentator has this praise for the English debenture system, "o systema ingleza e
muito practico.'
S. Both the terms "debenturista" and "obrigacionista" are used in the Brazilian law
and commentaries to describe the debenture holders, while "obligacionista" is the Spanish
equivalent used in the codes written in the Spanish language.
9. See Accordam do Tribunal de Justica de S. Paulo de 13 de Julho de 1914 where the
court said: "Considerando que os aggravados corn os poderes amplos e illimitados de
trustees que lhes foram conferidos, tinham o direito que lhes foi garantido de serem
admittidos como foram, a comparecer na reunifo dos credores da fallencia da companhia,
como representantes immediatos dos debenturistas e corn o direito de acompanhar a todos
os termos della, at6 final, zelando pelos direitos e interesses dos debenturistas"; Accordam
do Tribunal de Justiqa de S. Paulo de 22 de Outubro de 1914 which held that the bankers
"fossem admittidos a fallencia da companhia emissora, como representantes dos portadores
de debentures, quo n~o se apresentaram pessaolmente ou por procuradores expeciaes, visto
terem sido os ditos banqueiros reconhecidos pela companhia devedora como representantes
dos obrigacionistas para todos os effeitos." 12 Revista dos Tribunfes 20-21.
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debenture holders. The Tribunal by judicial legislation thus worked a
needed reform which had long been urged.' °
The new Brazilian decreto of February 6, 1933," however, now gives
legislative sanction to this use of the trust which formerly depended for
its recognition upon the more precarious basis of judicial decision. The
collective right of the "obrigacionistas" to appoint representatives to pro-
tect their joint rights is set forth in Article 10 of the decree which
provides that one or more representatives may be appointed by the as-
sembly with general power in their own discretion to take all measures
which they may deem necessary for the common interests of the debenture
holders, or, with limited powers to be specified by resolution, including
the power to institute legal proceedings, to demand the bankruptcy of the
corporate debtor and to represent the community of "obrigacionistas" in
the bankruptcy proceedings. The hopelessly outmoded system formerly
prevailing of individual action by bondholders is thus definitely abolished;
in fact such action is actually prohibited except in certain enumerated
cases. The new method thus established for the enforcement of the
rights of debenture holders through general assemblies with power to
appoint trustees to supervise the corporation and to protect the security
behind the obligations is the exact one which was unacceptable to the
Senate in 1893 when the Lei was enacted.
The laws of only seven other Latin American republics have made any
express provision for the issuance of bonds by domestic corporations.
These are Mexico, Cuba, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador and
Venezuela. The Panama Ley of 192512 adopts the Anglo-American trust
and permits a corporation as well as an individual to act as a trustee,
thus laying the basis for corporate fiduciary administration as practiced
in this country and in England. The Mexican Ley of 1897 as amended
in 1902,"3 characterized as the most successful attempt before the Argen-
10. This process of judicial assimilation was overlooked by American commentators
on the corporate finance laws of South America. Thus the Special Committee on Private
International Law and Conflict of Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York in its 1925 report, although it aptly characterized the Lei 177A as a "half-
hearted and inadequate attempt" to authorize bond issues in that, inter- alia, it failed to
provide for trustees to represent the bondholders, stated only a half truth in that it
overlooked the two "accordams" of the Tribunal. (1925) REPoRT or Tm BAR AssoczAnoN
or TuE Ciry oF NEw YoRic 436.
11. Decreto no. 22.431 de 6 de Fevereiro de 1933.
12. Ley 9A de 6 de Enero de 1925, art. 24. The terminology under this statute is differ-
ent from that of the Ley de Debentures and other statutes. Thus the trust is a "fidei-
comiso," the settlor or trustor the "fideicomitente," the trustee the "fiduciario" and the
cestui que trust a "fideicomisario." In all the other statutes of the Latin-American coun-
tries the "fideicomisario" is the trustee and not the beneficiary.
13. Ley de 29 de Noviembre de 1897 y Ley de 4 de Junio de 1902.
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tine Ley to legalize American trust indentures,14 did not adopt certain
English elements found in the earlier Brazilian Lei and the later Argentine
Ley,15 such as the floating guaranty (guarantia flotante), but conformed
instead to the American practice as distinguished from the English.
As to the remaining eleven Latin countries whose laws are entirely
silent on corporate bond issues, it would seem that reliance may be placed
on the general legal precept that what is not prohibited by law may be
stipulated by contract, 6 and that the power may be exercised as a simple
civil-law "promesa de mutuo" or "simple pr6stamo" governed by the civil
code or by the "pr~stamo mercantil" of the commercial codes. Further-
more, riractically every purpose of the Anglo-American trust can be ac-
complished by the Latin "mandato" or the civil-law relationship of
principal and agent. As already indicated, the Brazilian Tribunal has
termed a "mandatario" under a trust indenture a trustee.
While many jurists have contrasted the trust and different civil-law
institutions such as the "fidei-commissary," the only substantial differ-
ence between the two seems to be that the one has title while the other
does not. 7 If legal title is nothing more than a group of rights, and
the "fideicomisario" or "mandatario" is by statute or covenant given
the same aggregate rights that legal title gives the trustee, it is difficult
to find any practical distinction between the two. If the cestui que
trust's beneficial or equitable title imports no greater collective rights
than those inhering in the Latin debenture holder, the traditional divi-
sion of the common-law trust res into two titles is merely a formal matter
and does not suffice to create other than mere differences of terminology.
II
The Power to Issue Debentures
The power of a corporation to issue bonds or obligations, whether
registered or payable to bearer, was under the former provisions of the
Code of Commerce of Argentine limited by the paid-in capital existing
14. BAR ASSOCIATION REOrT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 434.
1. The Argentine Ley was more than an attempt to naturalize American finance
practices and its most characteristic features are English and not American.
16. BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 434.
17. The report of the Special Committee, in attempting to prove that the Argentine
Ley failed in some degree to naturalize in Argentine the American trust concept, cites a
statement of M. Jean Escarra which reveals the thin distinction between the common-law
trust and the civil-law "mandato." This statement is as follows, "Agent, manager, testa-
mentary executor, fideicommissary, guardian, none of these persons resembles the English
trustee, for this topic reason that none of them could say, .as does he, that he is
the owner of the properties which he administers." Id. at 426.
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at the date of the last approved balance sheet."8 This limitation was
in accord with the modern civil-law principle that a corporation should
not be able to borrow to an extent unwarranted by its economic power
as represented by its capital, and with the fear that if no limit were
placed upon its borrowing ability, the corporation might issue new
obligations to pay the interest on former ones.' 9 The articles which
contained this restriction are still in force in Paraguay by virtue of the
adoption in 1903 of the Code of Commerce of Argentine as the com-
mercial law of that country. Of the civil-law codes, the Belgian,20
Portugese2l and the Japanese2" impose the same restrictions. The
Italian and Roumanian codes, though containing a like limitation, permit
the issuance of obligations in a greater amount than the paid-in capital
if the excess amount is guaranteed by the deposit in the State treasury
of registered government bonds whose maturity dates correspond with
those of the obligations to be issued.23 The only exception to the rule
among the continental civil-law codes is France, whose legislative system
contains no restriction except in the case of certain local companies.14
In fact, certain French railroad companies with less than two million
dollars capital have issued obligations in an amount exceeding nine
times their capital.'
Other South American codes similarly restricting the issuance of bonds
are those of Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. The latter country
restricts the issuance of obligations to the authorized instead of to the
paid-in capital, excepting from the rule mortgage, railroad, navigation,
mining and colonization companies, but like the Italian and Roumanian
codes permits the issuance of debentures in excess of the capital stock
on the deposit of government, state or municipal bonds in the State
treasury with maturity dates coinciding with those of the obligations
to be issued.2" The Code of Panama similarly provides for the securing
of issues in excess of the authorized amount by the deposit of commercial
paper or instruments of credit satisfactory to the Treasury."
18. C6DIcO DE COIERCIO DE ARGENTINE (1927) art. 365-368.
19. 2 MALAGARRIGA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 268-269; 2 VivANTE, TRATTATO DI Dno
COMMERCIALE (4th ed. 1911-1914) 446; 1 CASTAGNoLA, TEsTI, FONTI, MonM, COMAnNTI
Di GIUEISPRUDENZA (1883-1894) 539.
20. CODE DE COMMERCE OF BELGIUM (1922) art. 99.
21. CODIGO COArsRCIAL PORTUGES (1924) art. 196.
22. COxMEaRCIAT CODE OF JAPAN (1932) art. 200.
23. CODICE DI COMnERCIO ITALIANO (1929) art. 171; RoumANmA CODICE DE COMERT
(1927) art. 173.
24. Loi de Juin 1880, art. 18.
25. THALLER, TRAITr ]L MENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL (4th ed. 1910) 388.
26. Supra note 6, art. 1, sub. 304.
27. C6DIGO DR COMERCIO DE PANAMA (1931) art. 409.
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The common-law countries, on the other hand, have considered the
economic advantages of an unlimited borrowing power as out-weighing
any theoretical disadvantages based on the abuse of the privilege. Apart
from charter or statutory limits, the amount of indebtedness is not
limited to the amount of the capital stock. While debt-limit provisions
govern the right of most municipal corporations to incur indebtedness,
there are generally no debt limits provided by constitutional provisions,
statutes or charter provisions in the case of private corporations, with
the exception that certain kinds of railroad companies are sometimes
prohibited from incurring indebtedness beyond the amount of their
capital stock or beyond a certain proportion thereof.2
III
Nature of the Security of Corporate Debentures
In England the word debenture comprehends all serial obligations
of the corporation whether or not secured by a charge or issued under
a trust deed, the latter being generally styled debenture stock. In
this country, however, debentures are defined as serial obligations or
bonds not secured by any specific mortgage, lien or pledge of security,
and are usually issued under an indenture in which a trust company
agrees to supervise the execution of the covenants of the debtor for
the benefit of all the holders. 9
The South American codes adopt the English meaning. There is
but one generic obligation, the "obligaci6nes" of the Spanish-language
codes and of the law of Argentine prior to the Ley de Debentures or
the "debentures" of the present commercial code of that country and
the "obrigac~es preferencia~s" (debentures) of the Brazilian code.
When secured by a mortgage of real property, the debenture is one
"Ccon guarantia especial" and when unsecured other than by a right of
recourse on liquidation to the general assets of the corporation, it is
one "sin guarantia" or "con guarantia flotante."3 ° The Brazilian "ob-
rigac6es-debentures" are not so classified, the Lei simply providing
that corporate "emprestitos" are secured by a lien on all the assets
of the corporation or specifically by mortgage, antichr~se or pledge.31
The debenture with special guaranty is the equivalent of our cor-
28. 2 FLETCHER, CYCLoPEDiA or CoRoRAoNs (1931) 1863, 1940.
29. BALLAN , MA-uAL or CoRaoRATioN LAW AND PRACTICE (1930) 912.
30. Supra note 3, art. 4, 5.
31. Supra note 6, art. 10, subdiv. I and HI. The antichrise is a special form of mort-
gage by which the possession of the hypothecated real property is given to the mortgagee.
2 CARVALHO DE MMMON(;A, op. cit. supra note 7, at 95.
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porate mortgage obligation. The debenture with floating guaranty is sui
generis. It is not a general mortgage, for, as will be noted later, it does
not have the condition attaching to that type of security under which the
debtor is prevented from giving a prior lien on the same real property
to a subsequent creditor. The debenture without guaranty is somewhat
of a misnomer, since it has characteristics which, while not constituting
a lien, are preferential in nature.
The floating-guaranty debenture finds its prototype in English com-
pany law although in the United States it seems to be non-existent.
This type of charge was first recognized in the case of In re Panama
Co., 2 where a company had charged its "undertaking" with the pay-
ment of certain debentures. In a decision characterized by Sir Francis
Palmer as of the "utmost importance," 3 Lord Justice Giffard acknowl-
edged the legal validity of a general charge on all the property of a
company, both present and future, by way of floating security. While
previous thereto future property could be charged in equity, this case
definitely established the floating security as an enforceable legal charge
on all the present and future property of a company. Subsequent deci-
sions elucidating still further the nature of the security, fixed the form
in which it was adopted in the Ley de Debentures. Thus Lord Mac-
naghten, in Government Stock Co. v. Manila Rail Co., 4 defined it as
S. an equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a going
concern. It attaches to the subject charged in the varying condition in
which it happens to be from time to time. It is of the essence of such a
charge that it remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to
be a going concern, or until the person in whose favour the charge is
created intervenes. ' 3
As a general charge on all the assets of the corpbration it crystallizes
into a definite preference over all unsecured creditors on default of
the corporation in the payment of interest on the debentures, or on
the appointment of a receiver. This is one of the peculiar characteristics
which it does not have in common with a debenture issued without the
floating guaranty, the holder of the latter ranking merely with the
ordinary creditors in a liquidation. An additional characteristic is one
not intended by Lord Justice Giffard, who in his dictum to the effect
that a company might notwithstanding the charge deal with its prop-
erty and in the ordinary course of the business, specifically excluded
sales or mortgages. In re Florence Land and Public Works Co.3"
32. L. R. 5 Ch. App. 318 (1870).
33. PALwER, ComPANY LAw (14th ed. 1930) 324.
34. [1897] A. C. 81.
35. Id. at 86.
36. 10 Ch. D. 530 (1878).
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and In re Colonial Trusts Corp.3" both recognized the power of the
company with assets so charged to create specific mortgages prior in
lien to the floating security and to alienate such assets. However, by
subsequent judicial application of the dictum, these specific charges
and alienations were restricted to dealings in the ordinary course of
business.3
The power of the corporate debtor in this respect, although not the
attendant restriction, is recognized in the Ley de Debentures. In
Brazil, at least, it seems that a corporation may legally divest itself of
its assets to the prejudice of the debenture holders. This fact has led
to severe criticism of the floating guaranty by the Brazilian com-
mentator, Carvalho de Mendon~a, who characterizes it as purely lu-
sory.30 Such a thought may have been in the minds of the Argentine
legislators in allocating the "debenture sin guarantia" and the "deben-
tures con guarantia flotante" to the same articles of the Ley and in
assimilating the characters of the two as well as the powers of the
fideicomisario under contracts creating both types of guaranty.
Malagarriga has, however, asserted that the use of the term "sin
guarantia" is a mistaken one, since every issue of debentures in Ar-
gentine is secured by a floating guaranty if by no other security.40 But
this latter statement is incorrect, as debentures issued without guaranty
have special characteristics distinguishing them from those issued with
floating guaranty. Furthermore, the statutory presumption in favor
of the floating guaranty in those instances in which the contract does
not limit the guaranty to specific assets, applies only where one of the
three types of guaranty, including the so-called "sin guarantia," is not
effectively created.
The provision of the Ley that only such sales of assets subject to
the floating charge shall be made as will not incapacitate the company
in the conduct of its business operates, nevertheless, to the same purpose
as the limitation of the permissive power of an English company to
dealings with its property in the ordinary course of business. The early
feeling manifested in In re Colonial Trusts Corp.1 that it would be
a monstrous thing to hold that a floating security prevented the making
of specific charges or alienations inasmuch as that would destroy the
37. 15 Ch. D. 465 (1879).
38. Wilhmott v. London Celluloid Co., 34 Ch. D. 147 (1886); Government Stock Co.
v. Manila Rail Co., supra note 34; Re Arauco Co., Limited, 79 L. T. R. 336 (1898);
In re Hubbard and Co., 68 L. J. Ch. 54 (1899); In re Victoria Steamboats, Limited,
[18971 1 Ch. 158; Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Limited, [1910J 2 K. B. 979.
39. 2 CARVALHO DE MENDONgA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 100.
40. 2 MALAOARRIGA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 271.
41. Supra note 37.
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very object for which the money was borrowed (the carrying on of
the business), is still determinative of English law on this point, ap-
parently having influenced the courts in the leading Irish and English
cases of In re Old Bushmills Distillery Co.,42 Cox v. Dublin City Dis-
tillery Co.3 and Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v. Maclure.44 In the
Bushmills case, Lord Ashbourne, after carefully reviewing the cases,
upheld a sale of whiskey which constituted the main assets of a distillery
company. The sale of these assets, which were charged with a float-
ing security, was for the purpose of raising money to carry on its
business. In so doing he remarked that the " . . . authorities are
strong and consistent to show that the courts consider that what is
necessary to bona fide keep the works going, what is required to prevent
a stoppage or paralysis will be upheld as done in the course of busi-
ness." ' Though Lord Ashbourne's dictum is broad enough to cover
the sale of all the assets of the corporation, its intent is the same as
the restriction of the Ley. In practice the two rules produce the same
result.
The Ley further contains certain provisions analogous to the debtor's
covenants of the Anglo-American trust indenture. These make the
floating guaranty in Argentine a substantial one. Thus the corpora-
tion may not issue similar debentures secured by the same floating or
special guaranty ranking pari passu with or prior to those already issued.
As heretofore indicated, it may not assign or sell the whole of its assets
or such part thereof as would incapacitate it in the conduct of its
affairs, nor may a merger take place with another corporation."'
The statutory enforcement of the special guaranty takes place only
in the event of default in payment of interest or in sinking fund pay-
ments. The floating guaranty, however, may be enforced whenever
the capital of the corporation has been impaired to the extent of
one-fourth of that existing on the date the obligations were issued.
It may also be enforced on the voluntary or involuntary liquida-
tion of the company and on the cessation of its ordinary course of
business.47 In addition, the fideicomisario of debentures issued without
guaranty or with floating guaranty has certain powers hereafter con-
sidered which the fideicomisario of a special guaranty debenture does
not possess.
For the complete protection of the debenture holders broad, restrictive
42. [1897] 1 Ir. R. 488.
43. [1906) 1 Ir. R. 446.
44. 21 Ch. D. 309 (1882).
45. Supra note 42, at 502.
46. Supra note 3, art. 12, 9.
47. Id. art. 19, 8.
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covenants of the Anglo-American type are necessary and in common
use. Unlike Argentine, Brazil has no provisions prohibiting the cor-
poration whose assets are subject to a floating charge from issuing
similar debentures secured by the same floating or special guaranty
ranking equally or prior thereto. The missing statutory provision must
be supplied by a covenant. On the other hand, the scope of the Ar-
gentine statute does not affect the company's right of hypothecation
and alienation of assets subject to the charge, but applies only to the
issuance of subsequent debentures. To cover this point in a manner
suitable to the requirements of investment bankers, additional cove-
nants are needed. These may be drawn on the model of those used in
the United States, limiting the right of pledge or sale of assets to
current assets to secure or discharge an indebtedness incurred in the
ordinary course of business, or insisting that the proceeds of a sale
be held by the trustees for the redemption of the debentures.18  Such
provisions might be deemed of greater protective value than the general
inhibition of the Ley against only such sales as would incapacitate the
company.
The debenture "con guarantia especial," like the "guarantia flotante"
or the "sin guarantia," is constituted by a special contract entered into
prior to the issuance of the debentures between the corporation and
one or more fideicomisarios as representatives of the future bond-
holders.49 The powers of the fideicomisario under this contract will
be considered hereafter. It will be seen that in many respects the
floating guaranty, in Argentine at least, is more efficacious than the
special guaranty, and certainly not to be accorded the treatment given
its Brazilian counterpart in the characterization thereof as an illusory
guaranty.
Debentures without guaranty have special characteristics despite
their designation, the preferences given them constituting true guar-
antees. ;0 The advantages of these debentures are similar to those
realized from the issuance of obligations with floating guaranty, since
the fideicomisarios under both types of obligations have similar powers
differing substantially from those of the fldeicomisario under the special
guaranty. The practical difference between the two debentures appears
when the fideicomisarios who exercise the power given them by Article
18 of the Ley of demanding the removal of the directors and taking pos-
session of the company, determine that the company's affairs shall be
liquidated rather than continued. Such liquidation must be in accord 'with
48. See CONYNGTO N-BEmNTT, COaioroxN PRoCEDum (1927) 537-538.
49. Supra note 3, art. 3, 6.
50. 3 MAwio Rivaxoi.A, op. cit. supra note 2, at 172.
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bankruptcy procedure and the holders of these debentures, unlike the
holders of mortgages, pledges, antichr~ses or debentures with floating
or special guaranty, have no right of preference but must share the
assets equally with the other unsecured creditors.
IV
Powers and Duties of the Trustee in Enforcing the Security
In England the remedy of a debenture holder on default where no
trust deed exists is to bring a representative action for the enforcement
of his securities. Where there is a trust deed the action is brought by
a holder of the debentures or by the trustees, although commonly the
former brings the action and joins the company and trustees as de-
fendants.51 In the Ley the duty of enforcing the securities is on the
fideicomisario whether the guaranty is special, floating or "sin guar-
antia," since a condition precedent to the right to issue debentures at
all, no matter how secured, is the execution of a contract with one or
more representatives of the future bondholders.
The fideicomisario has all the powers of a "mandatario" where the
debenture carries a special guaranty. And though the trust indenture fails
to so provide, or actually provides otherwise, he always has certain
enumerated powers. These include the right to examine the books and
accounts of the debtor, either in person or by proxy; the privilege to
assist in the meetings of the directorate although without the right to
vote; 52 and the power to demand the removal of the directors. This
latter power may be exercised in three situations: first, where interest
or sinking fund payments are not made within thirty days after the
due date; second, where the debtor has suffered an impairment of
capital to the extent of one-fourth of that existing at the date of issue
of the debentures; and third, in the event of a forced liquidation or
bankruptcy of the corporation.5"
If the fideicomisario requests the removal of the directors in any of
these situations, the court will forthwith remove them and substitute
the former in their place. He is then entitled to receive the assets of
the corporation under inventory without prejudice to the right of the
removed directors within ten days to litigate the truth of the allegations
of the fideicomisario. Should the directors determine on this course
of action, the fideicomisario must halt the liquidation of the company
51. PALwam, op. cit. supra note 33, at 342.
52. This power is described by the Italian jurist Vidari as 'Ia facolth di chiacchierare, e
nulla pi6." 1 VmARI, CoRso DI Dnrro CoAmRcr.aAL (4th ed. 1900) 120, n. 908.
53. Supra note 3, art. 18.
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until the issues are tried, limiting himself in the meantime to ordinary
acts of conservation and administration of the debtor's assets. The
preliminary order of removal may then be made final, or, if no issue
is joined within twenty-eight days after the entry of said order remov-
ing the directors, it automatically becomes so.54
The fideicomisario may then continue the business of the debtor with
the widest powers of administration, including the right to alienate real
or personal property, or he may liquidate the corporation should the
debenture holders so decide.5 If liquidation should be determined
upon, the fideicomisario would proceed to realize on the assets subject
to the floating guaranty, dividing the amount realized among the holders
of the debentures after payment of those secured creditors whose liens
are preferred to that of the floating guaranty. Any amount remaining
would be held for the benefit of general creditors and stockholders."
If the business is continued, the fideicomisario must from the receipts
of the business first pay current liabilities and then the interest and
sinking fund payments on the debentures. When the company's affairs
are adjusted, their administration passes again to whoever may be entitled
to it.5 '
Where the debentures are issued with special guaranty, the powers
of the fideicomisario are limited to the enforcement of the security by
simple foreclosure in the event of default in payment of interest or in
sinking fund payments.," Thus the fideicomisario of a special-guaranty
debenture has not the powers given by Article 18 of the Ley to fidei-
comisarios of debentures issued without guaranty or with floating guar-
anty, of examining the books and accounts of the corporation, of assist-
ing at the meetings of the directors, and of asking for the removal of
the directors in the three situations enumerated. Rather, the provisions
applicable to the special guaranty are those of the civil code regarding
mortgages and their enforcement and foreclosure.
It is undoubtedly this lack of the very important powers conferred
by Article 18 of the Ley on other fideicomisarios and by covenants on
the trustee of our mortgage indenture that has led to the criticism of
this security by American commentators. The Special Committee on
Private International Law and Conflict of Laws in its report describes
the different modes of procedure for placing an adequate lien or security
behind corporate bond issues as merely "palliatives" for a serious situa-
54. Id. art. 20-24.
55. The power to be exercised by the fideicomisario in this and other connections may
be enlarged or restricted in the trust indenture. Id. art. 20.
56. Id. art. 22.
57. Ibid.
58. Id. art. 19.
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tion in the present state of legislation in Latin America." But in view
of the failure of the committee to give any consideration to the sub-
stantial character of the floating guaranty as a security, this character-
ization is of little validity unless it is restricted to the special-guaranty
debenture. When consideration is given to several additional facts,
the recommendation of the committee that the only satisfactory solution
of the problem which the report raises is the modernization (along
American lines as the tenor of the report indicates) of the legislation
of those republics which have already attempted to naturalize the Amer-
ican institution of the mortgage trust, appears merely as an example
of juristic egocentricity. These facts are that the floating guaranty of
Latin America is substantially the same legal concept and institution
which England through years of experience has determined to be an
adequate mechanism for the greater part of her own corporate financ-
ing,6" and that Latin America has professedly based her corporate legis-
lation on the English rather than on the American model.
With the consideration of the further facts that trust indentures in
America are primarily regulated by conventional stipulation rather than
by statutory systems such as that of the Ley, and that the substantial
floating guaranty is unknown in this country, it is submitted that a
study pursued in the true comparative law spirit by a less nationalistic
committee might result in some profitable suggestions regarding the
advisability of a statutory statement or codification of our own practice
and body of judicial decisions and the introduction of the floating guar-
anty into our own financing practice.
As has been seen, if the debentures were issued "sin guarantia" and
there are other creditors, the fideicomisario must, if liquidation be deter-
mined upon, proceed under the Ley de Quiebras or the Bankruptcy
Law. The duties of the fideicomisario are then to act as the "sindico"
(receiver in bankruptcy) at the "concurso" (creditors' meeting), with
power to alienate the assets without judicial authorization."'
59. BAR AssocIAOrro REPORT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 439.
60. Sir Francis Palmer has this praise for the floating guaranty, "Nevertheless the
decision Re Panama etc. & Co., supra, was one of the greatest practical importance, as it
judicially recognized and established the power of a company to give a floating charge
on its undertaking, a form of security which has since approved itself to the commercial
community and to the investing public as of an eminently convenient type." PALIR,
COMPANY PRECEDENTS (13th ed. 1927) Pt. 3, at 68.
61. Supra note 3, art. 23.
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V
General Provisions Regarding Issuance of Debentures
Certain formalities are required in the issuance of debentures.62 The
corporation must first execute a contract with the fideicomisario as the
representative of the debenture holders. Its directors are then required
to prepare a prospectus which must be published for fifteen days in
the newspapers of the place where the debentures are issued. This
prospectus must set forth a number of facts, such as the amount of
the authorized, subscribed and paid-in capital, the kind of business
transacted by the company, the names of its directors, administrators
and trustees, the date of the recording of the contract between the
company and the fideicomisario, the general conditions of the contract
between the company and the fideicomisario, the rights of the debenture
holders, a list of the "deudas con privilegio," or secured obligations of the
company, together with an enumeration of previously issued debentures,
and a financial statement showing assets, profits and losses. The pros-
pectus must be signed by the directors, administrators and the fideicomi-
sario.0 3 The former are jointly liable for the truthfulness of the facts set
forth in the prospectus. Although there is no express liability imposed
upon the fideicomisario, it would seem on general principles that he too
would be liable were he a party to fraud in the issuance of a prospectus
containing false representations.64
These requirements have been criticized from an American stand-
point as seriously impeding bond issues as commonly made in the United
States, since the law seems to contemplate only the sale of bonds directly
by the corporation issuing them or by the agents of the corporation
and takes no account of the possibility of market fluctuations between
the time when the bonds are advertised and the time when they can
be sold and payment received therefor. In the United States the under-
writing firm or syndicate which usually takes the entire bond issue for
resale to the public would be unwilling to agree on a price for the bonds
and then wait for several weeks before the bonds could be issued. The
prospectus has thus been characterized as an unnecessary obstacle.'
Both the contract and the prospectus must be recorded in the public
commercial register and if the guaranty of the debentures is special,
the contract must also be recorded in the mortgage record, as it creates
a "gravamen hipotecario" or lien on real property. By express pro-
62. Id. art. 3.
63. Id. art. 28, 29.
64. Id. art. 29; 2 AALAAmIGA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 299.
69. BAR AssoclAmoN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 432.
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vision, a foreign corporation which issues debentures with floating guar-
anty must within six months of the date of issuance record the contract
in the public commercial register of the federal capital, if the property
subject to the guaranty is located there, or partly in one province and
partly in another, or in one province and in the federal capital. If the
property is situated entirely in the territory of a single province, then
the recording must be done in the commercial register of that province.
Failure to record makes the guaranty ineffective in that country. The
recording may be done by the corporation, the fideicomisario or any of
the debenture holders, but the liability for failure to do so is placed
upon the company which is fined one thousand pesos for each month
of delay.66
Similar provisions governing the issuance of debentures by foreign
companies are found in the laws of other countries. Thus the Mexican
law of 1897, which provided that obligations issued abroad should not
have any legal effect in Mexico unless the issue was made in accord-
ance with the provisions of that law, was amended in 19027 to permit
the issuance of foreign bonds on the Mexican properties of a corpora-
tion where, inter alia, the contract authorizing the issue is protocolized
in the Republic and recorded in the Register of Commerce and the
mortgage guaranty recorded in accordance with the laws of the State,
Federal District or Territory where the properties are located.
Debentures may be issued in registered (debentures nominales) or
in bearer form (debentures al portador). The registered debentures
may be transferred only by endorsement and have no effect against the
corporation or third parties until the transfer has been recorded in a
special bond register which must be kept by the corporation.68 But
whether in registered or in bearer form, they must contain a printed
statement of the following matters: the name of the corporation; the
date and place of the filing of its articles; the numbers of the series and
order of each debenture; the face value thereof; the total amount of
the debentures issued and whether with special or floating guaranty;
the names of the fideicomisarios; the date of the recording of the pro-
spectus and of the "contrato de prestamo"; the interest which the bonds
bear; the periods and place of payment; and the method and periods
of their amortization. The debentures may be accompanied by "cu-
66. Supra note 3, art. 30.
67. See note 13, supra.
68. Supra note 3, art. 31. Under the Brazilian Lei, supra note 6, art. 1, bonds could
only be to bearer. The new decree, supra note 11, has, however, changed this and permits
both bearer and registered bonds.
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pones" payable to the bearer although the main debenture of which
they are a part is a registered debenture.6 9
The joint liability of directors, administrators and fideicomisario for
false statements in the prospectus has been noted. The directors or
administrators who violate the requirement that the corporation must
execute a contract with the fideicomisario prior to the issuance of the
debentures, or who fail to see to it that the prospectus is drawn, or who
violate the other provisions of the Ley relating to the duties of directors
and administrators, are jointly and severally liable for the losses sus-
tained by the debenture holders and, if the claims of the latter are
reduced to judgment and are not paid within six months of entry thereof,
may be imprisoned for six months.70 In the opinion of Malagarriga, this
provision closely resembles the imprisonment for debt abolished by the
Ley 514 of 1872.71 The fideicomisarios, being "mandatarios," are not
personally liable for their acts in discharging the duties of the trust
except in the case of grave default or negligence in the discharge of the
"mandato."
The Ley also provides that a corporation which is "en poder del fidei-
comisario" (in the power of the fideicomisario) may not be forced into
bankruptcy by other creditors, the latter having only the right to insist
that their claims be paid in the order of their priority. If the corpora-
tion was declared bankrupt before the fideicomisario took charge of the
administration or liquidation, he then has the right to be named as
receiver.72 The fideicomisario may not resign his charge without judicial
consent. He may, however, be removed by the court on the application
of one or more of the debenture holders for good cause, and also without
cause by resolution of a majority of the capital represented at a deben-
ture holders' meeting.73 Substitutions of trustees may be made on the
application of the fideicomisario or of debenture holders representing
one-twentieth of the amount of the debentures; the court will, on a
majority vote of the capital represented, call an assembly of debenture
holders to nominate a successor.74 No one interested in the profits
and losses of a corporation may act as a fideicomisario except stock-
holders possessing not more than one-twentieth of the issued shares.7 5
69. Id. art. 33.
70. Id. art. 34.
71. 2 MALAGAMGA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 304.
72. Supra note 3, art. 25.
73. Id. art. 27.
74. The report of the Special Committee criticized this provision as being inelastic.
BAR AssociATIoN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 432.
75. Supra note 3, art. 15.
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This requirement has been criticized as easily avoidable, and the desir-
ability of a general prohibition against any stockholder acting as a
fideicomisario has been urged."
VI
The Assembly of Debenture Holders in Argentine and Brazil
The assembly of debenture holders in Argentine differs from the
"assambleas de accionistas" or stockholders' assemblies in many par-
ticulars. The ordinary "assembleas generales" of stockholders meet at
least once a year within four months after the close of the fiscal period
and perform the usual function of ratifying the directors' reports, nom-
inating new directors and officers and acting upon any matters specified
in the notice. Any stockholders' assemblies meeting at other periods
are termed "assembleas extraordinarias," the terminology, unlike the
French7' being based not on the object of the meeting but on the period
when it is called. The statute does not prescribe the specific purposes
for which the latter assemblies may be called; it simply provides that
they may be called in the discretion of the directors or officers, or at
the demand of stockholders representing one-twentieth of the capital
stock,78 to take action on any unforeseen situations which may render
the meeting necessary.79 There are, however, certain specified purposes
for which the assembly of debenture holders must be called. They do
not meet regularly for the reason that "the debenture holders'
only duty is to cut coupons periodically and so long as the interest is
paid nothing extraordinary will occur in the execution of the loan con-
tract. They do not have to elect directors or officers, being represented
by the fideicomisario named in the contract who has no fixed time to
carry out his duties nor can he renounce them without justifiable cause
in the discretion of the judge.""0  In addition to these specific purposes
there is a general grant of authority for the calling of such meetings
whenever a resolution of the debenture holders is required. The ma-
chinery for calling the meetings of these assemblies, unlike a stockholders'
meeting, can be set in motion only by the fideicomisarios, or by bond-
holders owning one-twentieth of the issued debentures, on application to
a judge who must himself call the meeting."'
76. 1 MAILAGARIGA, op. cit. SUpra note 2, at 283.
77. 2 LYoN-CAEM & RENAULT, MANUEL DE DROIT COMMERCIAL (10th ed. 1910) 249.
78. Supra note 3, art. 348.
79. 2 MALAGM PmGA, op. cit. supa note 2, at 220.
80. 3 MAR.o RivARoLA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 152.
81. Id. at 150.
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There exist six purposes for which the Ley requires the assembly of
the debenture holders: (1) the acceptance of the resignation of the
fldeicomisario and the appointment of a new one. Although the position
has an obligatory character, renunciation is not impossible where in
the opinion of the judge there is good and sufficient cause for it.82 (2)
The removal of the fideicomisario without cause by a majority vote
and the designation of a new trustee. This is not to be confused with
the right of the judge to remove a fideicomisario for cause.8 3  (3)
To obtain by majority vote of the assembly of holders of debentures
secured by the floating guaranty consent to issuance by the company
of new debentures of the same or higher grade of preference than the
debentures already issued.84 (4) To obtain the assembly's consent by
majority vote to the sale or assignment of the whole or a part of the
company's assets where such sale would prevent the company from
continuing in business. This consent is necessary where the debentures
are secured by a floating guaranty.85 (5) To obtain the assembly's
consent to a merger or fusion of the debtor where the floating guaranty
would be involved."" (6) To decide, in those cases in which the fidei-
comisario has assumed control of the administration, whether the com-
pany shall continue in business or be liquidated.87
The Ley makes no provision, as does the new Brazilian decreto of
last year, for the right of debenture holders to representation by proxy
in these meetings. Their right to act depends upon the presentation
or deposit of the debentures themselves, if they are bearer debentures,
or if registered debentures, then on the entry of title made in the registry
book which the company is required to maintain. There is nothing,
however, to prevent the exercise of the right of proxy, for the Code
of Commerce recognizes the rights of stockholders to appoint "manda-
tarios" whether they are strangers or not,8" although it further provides
that this right may be limited by the "estatutos" or by-laws. There
would seem to be no basis for differentiating debenture holders from
stockholders in this respect.
Unlike the Brazilian decreto which requires the deliberations of the
assembly of debenture holders to be recorded and attested by the presi-
dent, secretary, and representative of the debtor corporation and two
82. Supra note 3, art. 27.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. art. 12.
85. Id. art. 9.
86. Ibid.
87. Id. art. 21.
88. Supra note 18, art. 355.
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of the debenture holders present, and then publicly registered in the
Real Estate Register where the loan contract is recorded, the Ley does
not provide for the keeping of a minute book of the assembly. Never-
theless, the Code of Commerce requires such a book to be kept for
stockholders' assemblies.8 9 Since there is again no reason for differen-
tiation, it is thought that by analogy the same rule applies to these
assemblies. The practice has thus developed of keeping a record which
is signed jointly by the fideicomisario and the persons designated by
the assembly.
There seems to be no doubt that the assembly is an economic entity
through which the collective will of the debenture holders is expressed,
and the Ley regulates it as such. And while the Ley does not recognize
the assembly of debenture holders as a legal entity with juridic per-
sonality, nevertheless it confers powers on the assembly which in the
opinion of Rivarola evidences a tendency to acknowledge it as such.
In support of his position, Rivarola cites (1) Article 9, which provides
that a corporation issuing debentures secured by a floating guaranty
may not sell or assign its assets or a part thereof so as to render im-
possible the conduct of its affairs, and may not merge with another
corporation without the consent of the assembly of debenture holders;
(2) Article 12, which requires a corporation that has issued debentures
with floating guaranty to obtain the consent of the assembly to any
issue of other debentures of similar character which are to rank equally
with or prior to the former; (3) Article 21, which gives the assembly,
upon the default of the corporation, the right to determine whether the
fideicomisario shall continue to carry on the business of the corporation
or shall proceed to liquidate it; (4) Article 27, which provides that the
fideicomisario may be judicially removed for due cause at the request
of one or more debenture holders and without cause by a resolution of
a majority of the debenture capital represented at the assembly, and
empowers the assembly to make substitutions."
The latter article further provides that the assembly must be called
each time a resolution is required of the debenture holders and makes
applicable to these resolutions all the provisions of law relating to other
corporate assemblies, such as stockholders' meetings, thereby permitting
the determination by the assembly of all questions affecting the com-
mon interest.
By virtue of Article 27, declaring Articles 349 to 351 of the Com-
mercial Code applicable to these meetings, fifteen days' notice of the
meeting, setting forth the specific matters to be considered, must be
89. Id. art. 350.
90. 3 MAmo Rivmou, op. cit. supra note 2, at 149.
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given by publication. No action having legal validity may be taken
on matters not so set forth. A quorum, which is not required of stock-
holders' meetings, must be present, consisting of debenture holders rep-
resenting at least one half of the amount of the debentures issued.
This requirement, however, is waived in the event that such a quorum
is not present at the first meeting and a second one is called within
thirty days thereof on ten days' notice. 1 All resolutions must be taken
by a vote of the majority of the represented capital, except that no
debenture holder may cast more than one-tenth of the votes represented
by all the issued debentures nor more than one-tenth of the votes repre-
sented in the assembly.
The Ley is silent as to whether the assembly has power to modify
the contract between the corporation and the fideicomisario. Castillo
is apparently of the opinion that this power is embraced in the general
powers of the debenture holders, 2 although Rivarola holds this theory
to be a dangerous one unless the power is said to inhere in the assembly
acting by unanimous instead of majority vote. 3 He points out such
theoretical dangers as those that the assembly might forgive the in-
debtedness, or suspend for twenty years the payment of interest, to
the detriment of minority holders. While the Brazilian decree requires a
special quorum of two-thirds of the outstanding obligations for delibera-
tions involving vital modification of the loan agreement, action may be
taken by a bare majority vote of those represented.94 The danger of
unreasonable action is obviated by the necessity of receiving judicial
approval for all acts involving such modification, a safeguard which may
well have been inserted in the decreto to protect the interest of
minority holders and to allay such fears as those of Rivarola's.
This jurist believes that power of modification exercised by unanimous
vote would be acceptable, although the Ley may not be presently
interpreted to grant such a power to the assembly. In substantia-
tion thereof, he stresses the fact that Article 27, which made ap-
plicable to the assembly of debenture holders articles 349 to 351 of
the Commercial Code, omitted Article 354 covering the analagous case
of the changes of the "acto constitutivo," or act of incorporation, by the
assembly of stockholders 5  This omission would indicate an intent
91. This waiver of the quorum requirement applies even to an assembly of debenture
holders called to remove by majority vote of the represented capital one or more of the
fideicomisarios; the removal may be made at a second meeting within the same specified.
period, no matter what the quorum. See 2 id. at 298.
92. 1 CASTILLO, CuRso DE LAS SociEDADAs Co mRciALS (1916) 286.
93. 3 MAruo RIvARoLA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 155.
94. See the discussion at p. 595, infra.
95. 3 MAuio RivARoLA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 155.
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that the power of modification of the contract was not to reside in the
assembly of debenture holders. The most which may be inferred from
the law is that the consent of the absent debenture holders may be
implied when the vote of those present in a duly constituted assembly
is unanimous.
An additional point on which the Ley is silent is that of whether the
assembly has power to consent to or prevent amendments of the by-laws
("estatutes") of the debtor corporation. Rivarola draws the conclu-
sion that such power exists in a simple majority or a special majority
established in the contract of "emprestito." This opinion is based on
the fact that Article 9 of the Ley authorizes the merger of corporations
by vote of the assembly and that the act of merger is one of the amend-
ments of the by-laws permitted by Article 354 of the Code of Com-
merce. Furthermore, the power to amend the by-laws is not of as
grave import as that of authorizing the merger of the debtor corporation
or the issuance of new debentures of equal or greater right, and in no
way modifies the prime obligation of the corporation under the con-
tract, even if it might affect the guaranty.96
The recent decree issued by Getulio Vargas, as head of the pro-
visional government in Brazil, creates a legal community of interest
between debenture holders and confers certain powers on their assembly
which vest it with juridic personality. The decree has thus gone further
than the Argentine Ley. The procedural system for the enforcement
of the rights of the "obrigacionistas" which is embodied in the new
decree furnishes further convincing proof of the process by which the
modern civil law is becoming assimilated to the common law, particularly
in the field of corporate finance.
The decree gives exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of the
rights of the debenture holders in any matter affecting the general in-
terest to the "assembl~as gerais desses portadores" or the assemblies
of debenture holders,9" individual action being prohibited except in cer-
96. 3 MAP.io RivARoLA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156.
97. Formerly the only collective right enjoyed by the Brazilian debenture holders
was that of appointing a "fiscal" to assist in the stockholders' meetings but without the
right to vote. This right was described by the legislative commission as "a permiss.io
de gritar"--the right to cry out. The legislative commission had the following to say
of the inadequacies of the system of individual action: "Nos emprestimos sobre debentures
a defesa dos direitos dos credores pulverisa---se na multidio esparsa dos portadores de
obrigac~es. Converter essas unidades desaggregadas e solitarias numa collectividade or-
ganica, unificada por uma representacHo commun e permanente por uma solidariedade
activa, por uma tutela legal contra as negligencias e adbdicac~es do individualismo isolado,
interme, indifferente; eis um dos problemas vitaes para a moralidade desta categoria de
operacois financeiras, para extirpaciio dos abusos que as arruinam, desacreditam e entor-
pecem."
In the event of the insolvency of the corporate debtor, individual declarations in
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tain enumerated casesY s The community of interest is recognized as
existing only among the "mutuarios" or holders of obligations issued
under the same contract of "mutuo," in which the obligations are of
the same class with the same guarantees and provisions as to amortiza-
tion, redemption and interest. Thus each group of security holders has
its own assembly whose actions are binding only upon it. 9
Unlike the situation in Argentine, where the assembly is required
to be called by a judge, the Brazilian assembly is called by the issuing
corporation whenever its directors shall deem a meeting necessary, or
when a meeting is demanded in writing by debenture holders represent-
ing one-twentieth of the value of the debentures outstanding or by
the representatives of the debenture holders nominated in a previous
assembly. The demand of the "obrigacionistas" must be accompanied
by a certificate of deposit of their debentures in the Bank of Brazil or
its agencies. It is made directly to the company and not to an inter-
mediary as in Argentine where the request of the debenture holders
must be presented to a judge.' 0 If the meeting is not called within five
days of the date of the communication of the demand to the corpora-
tion, the debenture holders may then present their demand to the judge
of the district in which is located the principal place of business of the
corporation, who may then order the meeting immediately and tax the
costs against the corporation.10' Judicial recourse is thus a comple-
mentary remedy rather than an exclusive one as in Argentine.
The presiding officer of an assembly is determined according to
whether the meeting is called at the instance of the'corporation, by the
debenture holders, or as a result of judicial intervention. The two
bankruptcy against the corporation are excluded. The defense of the rights of the
"obrigacionistas" of a particular category is the duty of the debenture holder elected by
the general assembly. Supra note 11, art. 14.
98. Id. art. 2. Under Article 13 an individual holder may demand the payment of
interest or of principal which is due, or may demand the bankruptcy of the debtor, if
within a period of sixty days from the date of the default in payment, a meeting of
the assembly of debenture holders is not called, either by the corporate debtor or by
the representative of the assembly previously appointed, to consider ways and means of
protecting the common interest. Individual action is also admitted where the default
is of an amount owing to an individual holder and does not affect the collective interest
of the investors.
99. Id. art. 3.
100. The meeting must take place at the main place of business of the corporation
not less than fifteen days from the date of the first publication of the notice of the
meeting in the Diario Official and in two other journals. The notice of the meeting
must be published twice and must designate the day, the place, the hour of the meeting,
the object of the meeting and the name of the banks in which the "obrigacionistas" may
deposit their securities. Id. art. 5.
101. Id. art. 4.
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largest debenture holders act as secretaries and assist him. The names
and residences of the debenture holders present or of their representa-
fives, together with the exact number of obligations held by each, must
be listed and the list kept open for inspection. The right to vote by
proxy is thus clearly recognized. The list must be accompanied by the
certificate of deposit executed in conformity with the requirements of
the decree. The issuing corporation is obliged to furnish a certificate
signed by its president setting forth the number of debentures in cir-
culation. The minutes of the meeting and a formal resolution must
be drawn up in detail. The resolution, the powers of attorney to the
representatives and copies of the notice of meeting published in the
newspapers °2 are entered together in the Real Property Register where
the original loan agreement was recorded. 10 3  To function, however, there
must be a quorum consisting of the holders of three-fourths of the bonds
in circulation, excluding those belonging to the issuing corporation. In
the absence of a quorum, a second meeting may be called, not less than
eight days after the first. If a quorum is still lacking a third meeting
may be called not less than five days thereafter and the presence at
this meeting of the holders of one-third of the outstanding debentures
is sufficient.'0 4 Only those debenture holders may qualify as voters
who shall have deposited their obligations at least two days before the
date of the meeting, but the holders of proxies are not themselves re-
quired to be debenture holders. Each debenture is entitled to one
vote."" The expenses incurred in calling the meeting, depositing the
bonds and recording are to be paid by the issuing corporation.'
The subjects of the deliberations of the assembly are sufficiently
broad for all purposes.0 7 They include: (1) All means of protecting the
common interest of the debenture holders. (2) All temporary or defin-
itive modifications of the provisions of the "contrato de emprestimo"
or the contract of issuance, such as (a) the suspension for a definite
period of interest and sinking fund payments, with the addition of these
amounts to the principal indebtedness represented by the debentures,
or the issuance of interest-bearing obligations in the amounts of the pay-
102. If the assembly is called by the corporate debtor for the purpose of considering
any amendments to the provisions of the loan contract, the notice must be accompanied
by a statement of the reasons for such action and by facts, figures and other pertinent
data sworn to by the directors, including the opinions of two qualified accountants who
shall attest to the correctness of these facts. Id. art. 12.
103. 'Id. art. 6. The recording of loan agreements "a inscricfo de emprestimo" is
governed by art. 5, par. c, no. vi of the Lei no. 4.287 de Fevereiro de 1924.
104. Id. art. 7.
105. Id. art. 8.
106. Id. art. 9.
107. These are specifically enumerated in i. art. 10.
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ments thus postponed; (b) the extension of the maturity date of the
loan; (c) the substitution of the method of redemption by purchase on
the securities exchange for that of drawing by lots; (d) the elimination
of premiums payable on obligations purchased at a premium; (e) the
changing of fixed interest rates to indefinite or variable ones (income
bonds); (f) the reduction of the rate of interest and principal amount
of each obligation; (g) the acceptance of a novation by the substitution
of a new corporation as the debtor; (h) the renunciation of specific
guarantees originally inserted in the "contrato" for the benefit of the
debenture holders. (3) The nomination of one or more representatives
to protect the interests of the community.
The deliberations contemplated by subdivisions 2 (d), (e), (f), (g)
and (h) require a quorum of at least two-thirds of the debentures in
circulation, excluding those owned by the corporation itself. As in
the case of ordinary deliberations, a majority vote of the debentures
represented is necessary, but there is a further requirement of "homo-
logacao judicial" or judicial confirmation. This may not, however, be
withheld if all the formalities of the decree have been strictly observed
and the Public Minister gives his consent.08 Such judicial approba-
tion is not necessary to any of the deliberations undertaken by Argen-
tine debenture holders. But it would seem to represent a wise
precaution in matters so fundamental as the modification of the loan
contract.
The two laws also differ in the method of appointment of the trustee.
In the Ley the fideicomisario is appointed by the debtor company prior
to the issuance of the debenture, although in reality, as in the United
States, it is the banking group undertaking the debentures which names
the trustees. The contract between them is a third party beneficiary
contract for the benefit of future debenture holders, who ratify it by
purchasing the debentures. The fact that this ratification is speci-
fically provided for in the Ley"°9 has led some jurists to believe that
it was not a true contract, but Malagarriga defends its juridic character as
such. In Brazil the trustee (although only the word "representonte"
is used) is elected by the assembly of debenture holders. This practice,
which is substituted for the one formerly prevailing, is predicated upon
the belief that a trustee directly elected by the debenture holders is
more responsive to their wishes and will more diligently supervise the
enforcement of their remedies than one appointed by the corporate
108. Id. art. 11.
109. Id. art. 14.
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debtor itself. It is difficult to say whether or not this position is well
taken.
The decreto recognizes the former custom of appointing a fideicom-
isario in the "contrato de emprestimo" only to the extent of providing
that its remedies of collective representation and enforcement of the
rights of debenture holders shall be applicable to those contracts alone,
whether executed before or after the decree, which have not made such
provision."0 In the future it will not be necessary to supply a statu-
tory deficiency by contractual stipulation. However, there is still no
express statutory authorization in the decree for the contractual appoint-
ment of trustees.
The benefit of legal commentary on the new decree is as yet unavail-
able. But that it is modeled to some extent on the Ley de Debentures
of Argentine is apparent, for many of their provisions are identical.
In many details, however, it is quite independent of the Ley and its
draftsmanship is superior. The legal controversy between the Argen-
tine commentators, Castillo and Rivarola, as to whether the assembly
has the power to modify the "contrato de emprestimo," a dispute which
arises out of the lack of a specific grant of such power in the Ley, is
avoided by the specific delegation to the assembly of the power of
amendment. But like the Ley, the new decree is silent regarding the
assembly's power to consent to or prevent amendments of the by-laws
of the debtor corporation. Yet the general power of the assembly "to
take all protective measures for the common interest" would seem to
include it. There can be no doubt, however, that the decree has cor-
rected a fundamental deficiency in the corporate law of Brazil. It may
no longer be said of Brazilian debenture holders that "they do not know
each other, do not meet together; they are like the dust spread every-
where, and only when it is too late does it happen that they show them-
selves, join together and give the appearance of action.""'
VII
Comparatives of the Anglo-American and the South
American Law
The powers and duties of the fideicomisario and the remedies of the
debenture holders have their prototypes and equivalents in the Chancery
decisions of England and in the commonly accepted provisions of the
English trust deed. It may be said that there is much to commend
110. Id. art. 16.
111. 4 CARVAHO DE MENDON A, op. cit. supra note 7, at 146. The only knowledge
of the affairs of the corporation which the debenture holders formerly had was that
obtained from the corporation's balance sheet.
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the convenient method of the Ley of definitely embodying the prin-
ciples enunciated by these decisions in a thorough statutory formulation
needing but few corrective covenants, instead of leaving them in the
uncodified and chaotic condition of a mass of Chancery decisions and
contractual stipulations devoid of uniformity. The existing dissimilar-
ities, instead of representing deviations from the practice of direct
borrowing, are due to local adaptation of common-law theories and to
certain formalistic differences, such as the distinction between the trustee
and the fideicomisario which arises from the presence of legal title in
the former and the lack of it in the latter.
The English debenture holder who is not protected by trust deed
must bring an action to enforce the debentures whether they are se-
cured by mortgage or charge or are unsecured. This, however, is the
duty of the fideicomisario in any event, since every debenture holder
under the Ley is protected by an indenture. Thus it is only where
there is a trust deed creating the security that the English debenture
holder has the advantages always enjoyed by his Argentine counterpart.
None of the rights accrues to him which Article 18 of the Ley gives
the fideicomisario of a debenture without guaranty, except that his right
to present a petition for the winding up of a company either before or
after a judgment in the action brought by him, and to have a receiver
and a manager appointed, effects the same result as that when the fidei-
comisario exercises his prerogative of demanding the removal of the
directors, assumes possession of the corporation's property and deter-
mines upon the liquidation of the company. Even under a trust deed,
the responsibility of bringing an action to enforce a charge rests with
the English debenture holder, for it is the common practice to have
the company and trustees joined as defendants. The obligation of
enforcement of the security under the Ley is of course that of the fidei-
comisario.
Prior to the granting of a judgment declaring the debenture to be
a charge on the property and ordering a sale thereof, the English court
may, if necessary, appoint a receiver and a manager. The duty of the
former is confined to taking possession and protecting the property
over which he is appointed, while that of the manager is the continuing
of the business of the company for the benefit of its creditors. Both
duties are under the Ley assigned to the fideicomisario.
Apart from an action to enforce the security, the court may appoint
a receiver whenever the security is in danger. Typical situations are
those where the principal or interest on the debenture is in arrears;
where a company has become insolvent and has closed its plant, or
where a winding up of the company takes place or is imminent, or a
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company is disposing of its undertaking, or there are judgments against
the company, or the company is inactive, or proposes to distribute among
its members its only remaining asset." 2  These powers are the same
as those conferred on the fideicomisario by Article 18, but are broader
in their scope.
An historical cycle is completed. The common law has repaid to its
Roman predecessor in part at least the ancient debt incurred by the
Chancellor. It is perhaps premature to venture a judgment on the
adaptability of the Anglo-American system of fiduciary representation
to the Latin-American soil. In view of the many similarities existing
between the civil-law "mandatario" and the common-law trustee, the
necessary adjustments may involve but the formulation of a new legal
theory. Present defaults on the part of many companies will afford
ample opportunity for corroboration of the superior efficacy of the
system as a method of enforcing the rights of the holders of debenture
obligations.
112. McMahon v. North Kent Iron Works Co., [1891] 2 Ch. 148; In re Victoria
Steamboats, Limited, supra note 38; Hodson v. Tea Co., 14 Ch. D. 859 (ISSO); Wallace v.
Universal Automatic Machines Co., [1894] 2 Ch. 547; Hubbuck v. Helms, 56 L. T. R.
232 (1887); Edwards v. Standard Rolling Stock Syndicate, [1893] 1 Ch. 574; Higginson
v. German Athenaeum, 32 T. L. R. 277 (1916); In re Tilt Cove Copper Co., [1913]
2 Ch. 588.
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